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Abstract: In this paper, we extend the behavioral macroeconomic model proposed by De 
Grauwe (2011) by including fiscal policy. In this model, agents have limited cognitive 
capabilities and use simple heuristics to forecast output and inflation. However, thanks 
to a learning mechanism, agents can revise their forecasting rule according to its 
performance. This feature produces endogenous and self-fulfilling waves of optimism 
and pessimism (animal spirits). This framework allows us to show that the short-run 
spending multiplier is state-dependent. The multiplier is stronger under either extreme 
optimism or pessimism and reduces in periods of tranquility. Furthermore, the more the 
central bank focuses on output stabilization, the smaller the multiplier. We also show that 
periods of increasing public debt are characterized by intense pessimism, while intense 
optimism occurs in periods of decreasing debt. This allows us to show that governments 
face a trade-off between the stabilization of the output gap and the stabilization of public 
debt. We also evaluate our model at the zero lower bound and find that the lower the 
inflation target, the more likely the system can be gripped in a deflationary spiral that is 
dynamically unstable and characterized by chronic pessimism and exploding public debt.  
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The global financial crisis and subsequent economic dynamics have revived the interest 
in the role of fiscal policy as a macroeconomic stabilization tool. As a result, empirical and 
theoretical studies have been aimed at improving our understanding of some aspects 
related to fiscal policy such as: what is the impact of government expenditure on the 
general level of economy activity, how to avoid public debt upsurge, and how to 
maneuver fiscal instruments over the business cycle.     
Theoretical contributions have mainly relied on rational expectations DSGE models, in 
which the representative agent is able to understand the complexity of the underlying 
mathematical model. However, the global financial crisis has shown how agents do not 
fully understand the complexity of the world they live in. On the contrary, their cognitive 
capabilities seem to be very limited. This argument is strongly supported by the fact that 
empirical evidence of agents’ heterogeneity and limited cognitive abilities has been 
provided by using both laboratory and survey data (see Carroll, 2003; Branch, 2004; 
Pfajfar and Santoro, 2010; Frenkel and Froot, 1987, 1988; Hommes, 2011). Still, 
researchers have started incorporating behavioral economics elements in dynamic 
macro models only recently (see Driscoll and Holden, 2014), and this is especially true in 
relation to fiscal policy (see Evans et al., 2009, 2012; Gasteiger and Shoujian, 2014; 
Caprioli, 2015; Gabaix, 2016).  Furthermore, some contributions have highlighted how 
the linearity implied by rational expectations DSGE models makes them not fully suitable 
for fiscal policy analyses. The reason is that policies’ state-dependency is, to a large extent, 
ruled-out in such models (see Parker, 2011; Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2012).  
Therefore, studying the role of fiscal policy by means of macroeconomic frameworks able 
to take into account the cognitive limitations of agents can provide additional insights. 
This is what we do in this paper. Building on De Grauwe (2011), we present a dynamic 
macroeconomic model in which both fiscal and monetary policies can be studied under 
the assumption that agents have bounded rationality and form their expectations based 
on simple heuristics.  Following Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998), we treat the formation 
of expectations as being an interactive process between two types of agents. 
Fundamentalist agents forecast output and inflation based on their equilibrium and 
target values, respectively. The second type of agents use a simple forecasting rule based 
on extrapolating the last available observation of inflation and output. De Grauwe (2011) 
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implements these heterogeneous expectations in a standard three-equation New 
Keynesian model and shows how such a framework is able to generate endogenous 
waves of optimism and pessimism (animal spirits) that are strongly linked with the 
business cycle. We extend this framework by adding fiscal variables and a fiscal policy 
block formed by a public spending rule and by an equation representing the evolution of 
public debt.  Our framework generates very interesting results.  
The model provides theoretical backgrounds for the uncertainty regarding the spending 
multiplier. It supports the evidence of expansionary (restrictive) short-run effects of an 
expenditure raise (cut), but it also shows how the value of the spending multiplier is 
volatile and state-dependent.   
According to our results, the dimension of the spending multiplier depends on the timing 
of the fiscal policy, as its short-run effects change according to the state of expectations 
and animal spirits. The short-run multiplier is stronger under either extreme optimism 
or pessimism and is smaller in periods of tranquility. One policy implication is that 
austerity in periods of strong contraction will imply strong negative impact on output.  
Furthermore, we show that the impact of a change in public spending also depends on 
the behavior of the central bank. An active role of the central bank in the stabilization of 
output will reduce the real effects of fiscal policy. The more the central bank focuses on 
output stabilization, the lower the short-run impact of government spending on output. 
However, the degree of the central bank’s focus on output stabilization does not alter the 
general link between animal spirits and the spending multiplier, as the latter is stronger 
around, positive and negative, peaks in the animal spirits irrespective of monetary policy. 
Regarding the link between the fiscal stance and the level of public debt, our model 
confirms results in the literature concerning the required weight of debt stabilization in 
the fiscal rule in order to avoid disruptive debt dynamics. However, we show that, under 
common and reasonable calibrations of the fiscal rule, government spending is not able 
to reduce the presence of animal spirits even assuming strong focus on output 
stabilization. In order to be able to eliminate the presence of animal spirits, the fiscal 
authority should give up debt stabilization. We show that this result arises from the fact 
that periods of increasing public debt are characterized by intense pessimism and periods 
of decreasing public debt are characterized by intense optimism. As a consequence, we 
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also show that governments face a trade-off between the stabilization of the output gap 
and the stabilization of public debt.  
Finally, we study the functioning of our model in the presence of the zero lower bound 
(hereafter ZLB) on the nominal interest rate and show that the lower the inflation target, 
the more likely the system can be gripped in a deflationary spiral that is dynamically 
unstable and characterized by chronic pessimism and exploding public debt.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the equations of the model, 
explain the expectations formation, define the variable measuring animal spirits and 
discuss the calibration of the model. In Section 3, we analyze the basic characteristics of 
the model and explain the relations between animal spirits, output and inflation. In 
Section 4, we discuss the properties of the government spending multiplier in the long 
and short run.  In Section 5, we investigate the links between public debt, output, animal 
spirits and the conduct of fiscal policy. In section 6, we evaluate the model at the ZLB. 
Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2 The Model 
We extend the behavioral model presented by De Grauwe (2011). By adding a fiscal policy 
block, we can then study the role of public expenditure in a dynamic model characterized 
by non-linearity.  
 
2.1  Basic Equations 
The model consists of an aggregate demand equation, an aggregate supply equation, a 
Taylor rule, a fiscal policy rule and an equation representing the evolution of public debt.  
To this aim, the usual linearized 3-equation New Keynesian block (see Galí, 2008) is 
modified by adding government spending (𝑔𝑡) as the instrument of fiscal policy. This 
allows us to write the first three equations of the model as follows:  
 
(1)             𝑦𝑡 = 𝑎1?̃?𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 + (1 − 𝑎1)𝑦𝑡−1 − 𝑎2(𝑟𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡𝜋𝑡+1) + 𝑎3 𝑔𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 
(2)             𝜋𝑡 = 𝑏1?̃?𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 + (1 − 𝑏1)𝜋𝑡−1 +  𝑏2𝑦𝑡 − 𝑏3𝑔𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡  
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(3)             𝑟𝑡 = 𝑐1(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋
∗) +  𝑐2𝑦𝑡 + 𝑐3𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑡  
 
Equation (1) represents the aggregate demand, in which yt is the output gap in period t, 
rt is the nominal interest rate, πt is the rate of inflation and gt is public expenditure (as a 
percent of GDP).  ?̃?𝑡 represents the expectations and the tilde above E refers to the fact 
that expectations are not formed rationally. The way in which these expectations are 
formed will be specified in sections 2.2 and 2.3. We follow the procedure introduced in 
New Keynesian DSGE models of adding lagged output in the demand equation. This can 
be justified by invoking inertia in decision-making due to habit formation and 
institutional constraints. Given equation (1), a fiscal expansion at time t increases 𝑦𝑡 via 
𝑎3.  
Equation (2) represents the aggregate supply in the form of a New Keynesian Phillips 
Curve, in which current inflation depends on both a forward-looking component, ?̃?𝑡𝜋𝑡+1, 
and lagged inflation. Inflation at time t also depends on the output gap and reacts to 
changes in public expenditure.  The negative effect of government spending on inflation 
is explained in the literature by arguing that, following an increase in public spending, 
firms reduce the mark-up to meet the extra demand at the given prices (see Monacelli 
and Perotti, 2008)1. Then, the reduction in the mark-up implies lower inflation.  At the 
same time, there is an indirect positive effect of  𝑔𝑡 on 𝜋𝑡  operating via the changes in 
output (𝑎3 ∙ 𝑏2).  
Equation (3) represents the Taylor rule followed by the central bank, in which 𝜋∗ is the 
inflation target. Hence, the central bank is assumed to raise the interest rate (its policy 
instrument) when the observed inflation rate increases relative to the announced target. 
The intensity of the monetary authority’s reaction is measured by the coefficient c1. This 
parameter is important as it has been shown that it must exceed 1 for the model to be 
stable. This is also sometimes called the “Taylor principle” (see Galí, 2008). When the 
output gap increases, the central bank is assumed to raise the interest rate. The intensity 
of this increase is measured by c2. The latter parameter also tells us something about the 
ambitions of the central bank regarding output stabilization, as a central bank that does 
                                                          
1 Other contributions justify the counter-cyclicality of the mark-up by introducing good-specific habits (see 
for instance Ravn et al., 2006). 
6 
 
not care about output stabilization sets c2=0. Finally note that, as is commonly done in the 
literature, the central bank is assumed to smooth the interest rate. This smoothing 
behavior is represented by the lagged interest rate, 𝑟t-1, in equation (3).  
We have added error terms in each of the three equations. These error terms represent 
demand shocks (𝜖𝑡), supply shocks (𝜂𝑡) and monetary policy shocks (𝜇𝑡), respectively. 
These shocks are assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and constant 
standard deviation. 
Having included 𝑔𝑡 in the 3-equation New Keynesian block allows us to add a fiscal policy 
block.   
The fiscal policy rule assumes that the government pursues three objectives:  it smooths 
public expenditure, it aims at stabilizing the business cycle and it wishes to stabilize the 
level of public debt (𝑑𝑡): 
 
(4)             𝑔𝑡 = 𝑓1𝑔𝑡−1 −  𝑓2𝑦𝑡−1 − 𝑓3𝑑𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡  
 
Equation (4) assumes one lag in the reaction of fiscal policy to the output gap (see 
Muscatelli and Tirelli, 2005) and 𝑓2 measures the intensity of such reaction. The 
parameter  𝑓3 measures the government’s focus on debt stabilization. Fiscal policy shocks 
(𝑣𝑡) are introduced in equation (4) and are assumed to be normally distributed with 
constant standard deviation. 
The model is completed by a linearized version of the equation representing the evolution 
of public debt (the government’s solvency constraint). In this respect, we follow 
Kirsanova et al. (2007) and assume that the government buys goods and services (G), 
taxes income at a constant rate (𝜏) and issues nominal debt (D).  Thus, we can write the 
evolution of debt according to its standard equation: 𝐷𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝑟𝑡)(𝐷𝑡 + 𝐺𝑡𝑃𝑡 − 𝜏𝑌𝑡𝑃𝑡). 
By defining 𝑑𝑡 = 𝐷𝑡/𝑃𝑡−1, the linearized version of the equation is (see Kirsanova et al., 
2007; Kirsanova and Wren‐Lewis, 2012): 
 




In this specification r is the interest rate in the steady state, while 𝜏 represents the 
constant income tax rate. Thus, although our model assumes that fiscal policy is 
performed only via government spending, taxation is still included in the form of 
automatic stabilizer. As all the other shocks, also public debt shocks (𝜑𝑡) are assumed to 
be normally distributed with constant standard deviation.  
 
2.2  Expectations: Heuristics in Forecasting Output  
Under rational expectations, agents are assumed to have superior cognitive abilities 
allowing them to understand the complexity of the world they live in.  
In this article, we depart from this approach and take the view that agents have limited 
cognitive capabilities and use simple rules, heuristics, when forming their expectations 
as in De Grauwe (2011).  Specifically, we assume that agents can use two types of rules in 
order to forecast the output gap.  This approach has been pioneered by Brock and 
Hommes (1998).  
The first one is called a fundamentalist rule. According to this rule, agents use the steady 
state value of the output gap (which is normalized to 0) to forecast it.  
The second rule is an extrapolative one. By following this rule, agents extrapolate the 
previous observed output gap into the future.  The two rules are specified as follows: 
 




(7)              ?̃?𝑡
𝑒𝑦𝑡+1 = 𝑦𝑡−1 
 
The market forecast of the output gap is then obtained as the weighted average of the two 
heuristics:  
 





Where 𝛼𝑓,𝑡 and 𝛼𝑒,𝑡 are the probabilities that agents use a fundamentalist or an 
extrapolative rule and then 𝛼𝑓,𝑡+ 𝛼𝑒,𝑡=1. Clearly, 𝛼𝑓,𝑡 and 𝛼𝑒,𝑡 also represent the fractions 
of agents using the fundamentalist and extrapolative rules, respectively.   
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Although agents employ simple rules, this does not mean that they are irrational. In our 
model, rationality is intended by the fact that agents are willing to learn from their errors. 
Thus, we specify a learning mechanism by which agents continuously try to correct for 
their errors by switching from one rule to the other. 
The performance of the two forecasting rules is measured as follows: 
 
(9)           𝑈𝑓,𝑡 = − ∑ 𝜔𝑘
∞










Where 𝑈𝑓,𝑡 and 𝑈𝑒,𝑡 represent the utilities (performance) of the fundamentalist and 
extrapolative rules as based on the mean squared forecasting errors (MSFEs) of their 
predictions; ωk are the weights assigned to each forecast error in time. We make these 
weights declining because we assume that agents tend to forget and give a lower weight 
to errors made far in the past as compared to errors made recently. Hence, we specify 
these weights as geometrically declining and define 𝜔𝑘 = (1 − 𝜌)𝜌
𝑘 , with 0 ≤ 𝜌 ≤ 1. 
Under this specification of the weights, equations (9) and (10) can be rewritten as: 
 










We can interpret 𝜌 as the measure of agents’ memory. When 𝜌 = 0 there is no memory 




 and 𝑈𝑒,𝑡 = −(𝑦𝑡−1 − ?̃?𝑡−2
𝑒 𝑦𝑡−1)
2
. Thus, only the last period 
is used to measure the performance of the heuristics. On the contrary, with 𝜌 = 1 there 
is infinite memory because 𝑈𝑓,𝑡 = 𝑈𝑓,𝑡−1 and 𝑈𝑒,𝑡 = 𝑈𝑒,𝑡−1. 
As a further step, we need to specify how agents evaluate the utilities of the rules. In this 
respect, we apply discrete choice theory (see Anderson et al., 1992; and Brock and 
Hommes, 1997). If agents were purely rational, they would just compare Uf,t  and Ue,t in 
(9) and (10) and choose the rule that produces the highest utility. Thus, under pure 
rationality, agents would choose the fundamentalist rule if Uf,t>Ue,t and vice versa. 
However, psychologists have stressed that when we have to choose among alternatives, 
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we are also influenced by our state of mind (see Kahneman, 2002). The latter is, to a large 
extent, unpredictable as it can be influenced by many elements (weather, recent 
emotional experiences, etc). One way to formalize this is to assume that the utilities of the 
two alternative rules have a deterministic component (Uf,t and Ue,t as represented in (9) 
and (10)) and a random component εf,t and εe,t. Thus, the probability of choosing the 
fundamentalist rule is given by: 
 
(13)          𝛼𝑓,𝑡=P[𝑈𝑓,𝑡+𝜀𝑓,𝑡> 𝑈𝑒,𝑡+𝜀𝑒,𝑡] 
 
This means that the probability of selecting the fundamentalist rule is equal to the 
probability that the stochastic utility associated with using this rule exceeds the 
stochastic utility of using the extrapolative rule. 
In order to derive a more precise expression, we have to specify the distribution of the 
random variables εf,t and εe,t. Assuming that they are logistically distributed (see Anderson 
et al., 1992; Manski and McFadden, 1981), we obtain the following expressions for the 
probability of choosing the fundamentalist rule: 
 





Similarly, the probability that an agent will use the extrapolative forecasting rule is: 
 
(15)           𝛼𝑒,𝑡= 
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛾𝑈𝑒,𝑡)
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛾𝑈𝑓,𝑡)+𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛾𝑈𝑒,𝑡)
 = 1 - 𝛼𝑓,𝑡 
 
Equation (14) shows that as the past forecast performance of the fundamentalist rule 
improves relative to that of the extrapolative one, agents are more likely to select the 
fundamentalist rule for their forecasts of the output gap. As 𝛼𝑓,𝑡 and  𝛼𝑒,𝑡 also represent 
the fractions of agents using the fundamentalist and extrapolative rules, equations (14) 
and (15) show how these fractions are time dependent. This is the most important feature 
of the model, because it implies that the number of agents using the two rules is not 
constant and changes according to the utility (performance) of these rules. Hence, 
𝛼𝑓,𝑡 and  𝛼𝑒,𝑡 change over time and such changes are endogenously generated within the 
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model. According to equations (14) and (15), the distribution of agents in the two 
categories is also determined by the parameter 𝛾.  This parameter measures the agents’ 
willingness to learn (intensity of choice) and it is related to the variance of the random 
components in (13). When the variance goes to infinity, γ approaches 0. In that case 
agents decide to be fundamentalist or extrapolator by tossing a coin and the probability 
to be fundamentalist (or extrapolator) is exactly 0.5. Therefore, in this case agents do not 
learn from past mistakes. As γ increases, agents become more sensitive to the past 
performance of the rules they use and then are more willing to learn from past errors 
(see De Grauwe, 2012). When γ = ∞ , the variance of the random components is zero (the 
measure of the rule performance is then fully deterministic) and the probability of using 
a fundamentalist rule is either 1 or 0. 
Thus, the selection mechanism that we employ should be interpreted as a learning 
mechanism based on “trial and error”. When agents observe that the rule they use 
performs less well than the alternative one, they are willing to switch to the more 
performing rule. Put differently, agents avoid making systematic mistakes by constantly 
being willing to learn from past mistakes and to change their behavior.  
 
2.3  Expectations: Heuristics in Forecasting Inflation 
The expectations on inflation follow the same logic applied to the output gap. Also for 
inflation, agents are assumed to switch between a fundamentalist and an extrapolative 
rule. However, when the central bank explicitly announces its inflation target, inflation 
fundamentalists are assumed to base their expectations on the central bank's target (π*). 
Therefore, we define this rule as inflation targeting and the agents adopting it as 
targeters. By contrast, inflation extrapolators behave exactly as output gap extrapolators 
do: by naively forecasting inflation based on the last available observation of inflation. 
Also the inflation forecast is obtained as a weighted average of these two rules:  
 









𝑒𝑥𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 = 𝜋𝑡−1 representing the targeting and extrapolative 
inflation expectations, respectively.  Also in this case, 𝛽𝑡𝑎𝑟,𝑡 and  𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑡,𝑡  are the fractions of 
agents using the two rules and therefore  𝛽𝑡𝑎𝑟,𝑡+ 𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑡,𝑡=1.  
As we apply to inflation forecasts the same selection mechanism used in the case of 
output, we can express the fractions of agents using the two rules as follows:  
 









Where 𝑈𝑡𝑎𝑟,𝑡 and 𝑈𝑒𝑥𝑡,𝑡 measure the forecast performance of using the targeting and 
extrapolative rules and are defined in the same way as in (9) and (10). Therefore, also the 
selection of the forecasting rule for inflation is based on adaptive learning, with 𝛽𝑡𝑎𝑟,𝑡 and 
𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑡,𝑡 changing over time according to the performance of their respective rules. 
 
2.4  Defining Animal Spirits 
Our model allows us to define an index of market sentiments, which we call animal spirits, 
reflecting how optimistic or pessimistic these forecasts are. We define animal spirits as: 
 
(19)         𝑆𝑡={
𝛼𝑒,𝑡 − 𝛼𝑓,𝑡        𝑖𝑓    𝑦𝑡−1 > 0   
−𝛼𝑒,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑓,𝑡  𝑖𝑓    𝑦𝑡−1 < 0
 
 
Hence, the index of animal spirits ranges between -1 (maximum level of pessimism) and 
+1 (maximum level of optimism). The index considers two possibilities depending on the 
sign of 𝑦𝑡−1. 
When 𝑦𝑡−1>0, extrapolators forecast a positive output gap. The fraction of agents who 
make such a positive forecasts is 𝛼𝑒,𝑡.  On the contrary, under the same circumstance, 
fundamentalists make a pessimistic forecast since they expect the positive output gap to 
decline towards the equilibrium value of 0. The fraction of agents who make such a 
forecast is 𝛼𝑓,𝑡. We subtract this fraction of pessimistic forecasts (𝛼𝑓,𝑡)  from the fraction 
of agents making a positive forecast (𝛼𝑒,𝑡). When these two fractions are equal (both are 
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then 0.5) market sentiments are neutral, i.e. optimists and pessimists cancel out and St=0. 
When the fraction of optimists 𝛼𝑒,𝑡 exceeds the fraction of pessimists 𝛼𝑓,𝑡, St becomes 
positive. As we will see, the model allows for the possibility that 𝛼𝑒,𝑡 = 1. In that case 
there are only optimists and St=1.  
When 𝑦𝑡−1<0, extrapolators forecast a negative output gap. The fraction of agents making 
such negative forecasts is 𝛼𝑒,𝑡.  We give this fraction a negative sign. At the same time, 
fundamentalists make an optimistic forecast when 𝑦𝑡−1<0, because they expect the 
negative output gap to increase towards the equilibrium value of 0. The fraction of agents 
making such a forecast is 𝛼𝑓,𝑡. We give this fraction of optimistic forecasts a positive sign. 
Again, market sentiments are neutral when these two fractions are equal, i.e. optimists 
and pessimists cancel out and St=0. When the fraction of pessimists, 𝛼𝑒,𝑡, exceeds the 
fraction of optimists 𝛼𝑓,𝑡, St becomes negative. When 𝛼𝑒,𝑡 = 1, there are only pessimists 
and St=-1.  
Given that 𝛼𝑓,𝑡+ 𝛼𝑒,𝑡=1, we can re-write equation (19) as: 
 
(20)         𝑆𝑡={
𝛼𝑒,𝑡 − (1 − 𝛼𝑒,𝑡) = 2𝛼𝑒,𝑡 − 1               𝑖𝑓    𝑦𝑡−1 > 0   
−𝛼𝑒,𝑡 + (1 − 𝛼𝑒,𝑡) = −2𝛼𝑒,𝑡 + 1          𝑖𝑓    𝑦𝑡−1 < 0
 
 
2.5  Calibration 
The model has non-linear features, making it difficult to arrive at analytical solutions. 
Thus, we will use numerical methods to analyze its dynamics.  
To this aim, we have to calibrate the model. Table 1 presents the values used in the 
calibration exercise, together with references to articles where single parameters are 
calibrated like in our study.  
It is worth noting that the calibration of equation (5) has been conducted by assuming a 
debt to GDP ratio of 60% in the steady state, and a 4% yearly risk free return (these are 
common practice in the literature2). The five shocks (demand, supply, interest rate, public 
expenditure and public debt shocks) are independently and identically distributed, with 
zero mean and constant standard deviation equal to 0.5 (see De Grauwe, 2012). 
                                                          
2 See Ferrero (2009), Kirsanova et al. (2015) and (2017) and Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis (2012). 
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Table 1: Calibrated Parameters of the Model 
 
3 Animal Spirits, Output and Inflation  
Figure 1 shows the movements of the output gap and animal spirits in the time domain 
(panel A) and in the frequency domain (panels B and C) as resulting from the simulation 
of our model5. Panel A shows a strong cyclical movement of the output gap in which the 
autocorrelation coefficient is 0.966. Panels A and C allow us to confirm that the model 
                                                          
5 Note that the calibrated model was simulated for 2000 periods but, for the sake of clarity, in panel A we 
show the results from period 1000 to 1350. However, the full series do not differ from the results reported 
in this section. The same applies to figure 2.  
6 This value is very close to the one reported in De Grauwe (2012) for the U.S.A. between 1960 and 2009. 
 
 
a1=0.5 Coefficient of expected output in output equationˠ 
a2=0.2 Interest elasticity of output equationˠ 
a3=0.25 Coefficient of public expenditure in output equation˟,ᶾ 
b1=0.5 Coefficient of expected inflation in inflation equationˠ 
b2=0.05 Coefficient of output in inflation equationˠ 
b3=0.03 Coefficient of public expenditure in inflation equation˟ 
c1=1.5 Coefficient of inflation in Taylor ruleˠ 
c2=0.5 Coefficient of output in Taylor ruleˠ 
c3=0.5 Interest smoothing parameter in Taylor rule∗ 
π*=0 Central bank’s inflation target∗ 
f1=0.6 Public expenditure smoothing in fiscal ruleˤ 
f2=0.4 Coefficient of output in fiscal ruleԊ 
f3=0.03 Coefficient of public debt in fiscal ruleԊ 
r=0.01 S.S. interest rate˟,ᶾ 
h1=0.4 Coefficient of public expenditure in debt equation† 
h2=1.6   Coefficient of output in debt equation† 
τ=0.3 Income tax rate‡ 
γ=2 Intensity of choice parameter∗ 
ρ=0.5 Memory parameter∗ 
Note: See, among others, ˠGalí (2008), *De Grauwe (2012).  ԊKirsanova et al. (2005), 
ˤMuscatelli and Tirelli (2005), ˟Galí  and Monacelli (2008), ᶾKirsanova and Wren-Lewis 
(2012) and Galí  and Monacelli (2005), †Kirsanova et al. (2012), ‡Ferrero (2009).  
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produces waves of optimism and pessimism (animal spirits) that can lead to a situation 
where everybody becomes optimist (St = 1) or pessimist (St = -1). 
 
Figure 1: Output and Animal Spirits 
 
         [A] 
 
                                      
                                             [B] 
                                          
                                             [C] 
  
 
From panel A, we can conclude that the output gap is highly correlated with animal 
spirits.  According to our simulation, the correlation between animal spirits and output 
gap is +0.85. When optimists dominate, this translates into above average output gap. 
Such periods are then followed by pessimistic ones, where pessimist agents dominate 
and the output gap is below average. These waves of optimism and pessimism are 
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generated endogenously. They arise because optimistic (pessimistic) forecasts are self-
fulfilling and therefore attract more agents into being optimist (pessimist)7.  
The self-fulfilling mechanism is generated by the set of equations representing the 
expectations formation in the model and it can be explained as follows. A series of random 
shocks creates the possibility that one of the forecasting rules (e.g., the extrapolative one) 
has a higher performance. This will induce some fundamentalist agents to switch to the 
extrapolative forecasting rule. If the successful extrapolation refers to positive output 
gap, more agents will start to extrapolate a positive output gap. This will result in a 
contagion effect leading to an increase in the use of the optimistic extrapolation of the 
output gap. This stimulates aggregate demand (see equation (1)) and a boom is created. 
The increase in the aggregate demand leads to a situation in which those who have made 
optimistic forecasts are vindicated. This attracts more agents using optimistic forecasts 
and leads to a self-fulfilling dynamics in which most agents become optimists.  The same 
logic can be applied to explain a bust.   
We present the frequency distribution of the output gap in panel B of figure 1.  First, we 
find that the output gap is not normally distributed, with excess kurtosis (in this case 
kurtosis is 5.64) and fat tails. Moreover, the Jarque-Brera test rejects normality of the 
distribution of the output gap. It is worth noting that the stochastic shocks in the model 
are all i.i.d., thus the non-normality of the distribution of the output gap is generated by 
the model itself. This contrasts with standard linear DSGE models that are only able to 
produce non-normal movements in output by introducing non-normally distributed 
shocks.   
We obtain more insights on this mechanism by also looking at the frequency distribution 
of animal spirits in panel C of figure 1. Panel C shows how, in our model, the origin of the 
non-normality of the distribution of the output gap can be found in the distribution of the 
animal spirits. We can see that there is a concentration of observations at the extreme 
values of +1 (everybody is optimist) and -1 (everybody is pessimist) with a substantial 
amount of periods of tranquility in which animal spirits are around 0 (neither optimism 
nor pessimism prevail). These extreme values of animal spirits explain the fat tails 
                                                          
7 The turnaround between the waves of optimism and pessimism can arise due to several factors, including 
shocks and policy interventions. 
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observed in the distribution of the output gap. The interpretation of this result resides, 
again, in the nature of the expectations. When the market is gripped in a self-fulfilling 
movement of optimism (or pessimism), this can lead to a situation where everybody 
becomes optimist (pessimist). Therefore, movements in waves of optimism and 
pessimism characterize the dynamics of animal spirits and this also leads to intense 
booms and busts in economic activity.  
In De Grauwe (2012) empirical evidence is provided indicating that observed output gap 
in industrial countries exhibits non-normality (due to fat tails and excess kurtosis) and 
that the output gap is highly correlated with empirical measures of animal spirits. Our 
model mimics these empirical observations and is particularly suited to understand the 
nature of the business cycle characterized by periods of tranquility alternated by periods 
of booms and busts. 
In figure 2, we also present the simulated time path of the inflation rate and the fraction 
of agents using the extrapolative rule to predict the inflation. According to figure 2, we 
can identify two regimes in the link between the expectations formation and the inflation 
rate. 
 





The simulated series show that agents tend to use the extrapolative rule when the 
inflation rate deviates from the central bank’s target by around ±2% or more. Conversely, 
when the observed inflation rate is around the target of the monetary authority, more 
agents tend to form their inflation forecasts based on the central bank’s declared target. 
 
4 Real Effects of Government Spending  
The next step in our analysis is to investigate how shocks are transmitted in the economy 
by performing an impulse response analysis. In our model, impulse response functions 
(hereafter IRFs) are obtained by simulating two series of the endogenous variables: one 
is the series without the shock (baseline series) and the other is the series with the shock. 
Then, the IRF can be obtained by subtracting the former series from the latter. The IRF is 
then standardized by dividing it by the shock itself. The shocks are one standard deviation 
of the random disturbances in equations (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5).  
Since we employ a non-linear model, during the post-shock period we continue to allow 
for random disturbances. Thus, the IRFs measure the response to the shock in an 
environment in which the random disturbances are the same for the series with and 
without the shock. The peculiarity of our behavioral model is that, for the same 
parameters of the model, the IRFs are different for each realization of the stochastic 
shocks. This contrasts with rational expectations models where the IRFs are not sensitive 
to the realization of the stochastic shocks.  
Due to these features of the model, we present the average IRFs. For each IRF, the model 
has been simulated 1000 times with 1000 different realizations of the shocks, and then 
the mean response and the standard deviations have been computed. We have 
introduced the shocks after 100 periods in order to allow the system to converge to its 
ergodic distribution. In what follows, we will focus on the main aspects related to fiscal 
policy.  
Figure 3, panel A, shows the mean response of the output gap following a positive 
expenditure shock (the dashed lines are the mean response + and -2 standard deviations). 
The IRF shows that an expansionary fiscal policy has a positive instantaneous effect on 
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An important insight suggested by the figure is that there is a considerable level of 
uncertainty surrounding the real effects of fiscal policy. This can be easily verified from 
the fact that the dashed lines are far from the mean IRF. Note that figure 3, panel A, also 
shows that the uncertainty about the response tends to disappear in the long run. 
This uncertainty can also be illustrated by presenting the frequency distribution of the 
cumulated output gap reaction following the fiscal policy shock. In order to do so, we 
differentiate between the short- and long-term cumulative output reaction. 
The short-run effect of fiscal policy is computed by cumulating the effects of the first 4 
periods after the shock, while the long-run effect is the sum considering the entire IRF.  
Panels B and C of figure 3 confirm how uncertainty regarding the effects of an increase in 
public spending is particularly relevant in the short run. A short-run multiplier of 1.1 is 
the most recurrent across the 1000 simulations but, according to panel B, it ranges 
between 0.7 and 1.3. In the long run, such uncertainty is less pronounced as the total 
effect tends to 0. This is due to the fact that, according to equation 4, the fiscal authority 
maintains a debt constraint.     
Where does the uncertainty about the effects of fiscal policy come from? It does not come 
from parameters uncertainty because the values of the parameters are constant in the 
1000 simulations used to obtain the average IRFs. The uncertainty is generated by the 
expectations formation process. In our behavioral model, each realization of the shocks 
creates different waves of optimism and pessimism. Thus, a fiscal shock that occurs in 
period 100 in one simulation happens under different realizations of the animal spirits 
than in another simulation. In addition, the fiscal shock itself affects market sentiments. 
As a result, the short-term effects of a public expenditure shock become volatile and, 
therefore, hard to predict. 
Another way to interpret this result is to say that the timing of the shock is important and 
that the effects of fiscal policy are state-dependent. The same public spending policy, 
applied at different times, can have different short-term effects on output depending on 
the state of the animal spirits.  To confirm this result, we show the importance of the 
animal spirits in panel D of figure 3. On the horizontal axis we plot the mean value of the 
animal spirits index up to the fourth period after the shock. On the vertical axis the 
cumulated reaction of the output to the fiscal policy shock, in the same period, is shown. 
Thus, this figure represents the relation between animal spirits and the short-run 
20 
 
spending multiplier. From the figure, we can conclude that there is a link between animal 
spirits and the real effects of fiscal policy. The effect of a change in public expenditure is 
stronger in periods of extreme pessimism or optimism, while in periods of relative 
tranquility (animal spirits around 0) the lowest output reaction is observed.  
These results highlight how the difference in the nature of uncertainty between our 
behavioral model and a rational expectations one has everything to do with the fact that 
the former has non-linear features while the latter is linear. Hence, the additional 
uncertainty produced by the behavioral model, i.e. the dependence of the IRFs on the 
state of the economy and animal spirits, is the outcome of its non-linearity.  
There are other sources of the state-dependency of the multiplier. Hence, we also focus 
on how monetary policy affects the spending multiplier. In panel E of figure 3 we show 
how the monetary authority reacts to an increase in government spending by increasing 
the interest rate. This is the result of the fact that the fiscal stimulus affects output and 
moves inflation away from the central bank’s target, triggering a reaction in its policy 
instrument. Thus, the central bank tends to reduce the effects of fiscal policy in the short 
run. This suggests that the more the central bank reacts to changes in the output gap, the 
lower the public spending multiplier. In order to confirm this insight, we also show how 
different values of the output parameter in the Taylor rule affect the fiscal policy 
multiplier. This is done in Figure 4 where we replicate the analysis reported in panel D of 
figure 3, allowing for different values of the output parameter, c2, in the Taylor rule.   
Figure 4 makes clear that a less active role of the central bank in the stabilization of output 
(a reduction in c2) increases the effects of fiscal policy on the level of economic activity. 
This adds another dimension to the state-dependency of the fiscal multiplier, as it also 
changes according to the level of the central bank’s activism9.  
Finally, it is worth noting how figure 4 shows that the different configurations of the 
Taylor rule do not alter the link between animal spirits and the short-run multiplier, as 
the shape of the fitted line does not change across different specifications of the Taylor 
rule. The spending multiplier results to be always higher in periods of extreme optimism 
                                                          
9 Figure 4 shows how the multiplier can go from a maximum of 1.7, scored when c2=0, to a minimum of 0.5, 
obtained under the condition that c2=1. 
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or pessimism and scores lower values in the absence of animal spirits irrespective of the 
Taylor rule parameter for output stabilization.  
 









Given the strong correlation between animal spirits and the output gap (see figure 1 panel 
A), we can extend our results and say that the model also predicts that the spending 
multiplier is higher in both positive and negative peaks of the business cycle. Thus, one 
can conclude that countercyclical fiscal policies are likely to be very effective in 
smoothing the cycle around its (positive and negative) peaks. This also suggests that 
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austerity measures during deep recessions are detrimental and are likely to intensify 
these recessions. The underlying reason for such result is that animal spirits amplify the 
effects of fiscal policy in periods of extreme optimism and pessimism.   
 
5 Fiscal Rule, Stabilization, Public Debt Dynamics and Animal Spirits 
In this section, we study how different configurations of the fiscal policy rule affect the 
behavior of the system.  First, we focus on public debt stability10. In figure 5, we report 
the IRFs for public debt following a debt shock under different configurations of the debt 
parameter in the fiscal rule.  We observe that when the parameter f3 declines, it takes 
longer for the effects of the shock to disappear. Furthermore, three possible 
configurations guarantee the stabilization of debt, but with different timing. Among these, 
there is also our standard calibration of table 1 (f3=0.03). Figure 5 shows that when the 
debt parameter in the fiscal rule approaches the value of 0.005 public debt is dynamically 
unstable. 
 
Figure 5: Debt Stabilization and Fiscal Rule 
 
 
                                                          
10 A comparable exercise is done by Kirsanova et al. (2005) in a similar, although purely backward looking, 
5-equation model. They find that values of f3<0.01 make it impossible to stabilize public debt.   
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Hence, according to this sensitivity analysis, when the feedback coefficient on debt (f3) is 
too small, debt interest payments will cumulate making it very difficult to stabilize public 
debt.  
After establishing how the fiscal authority can guarantee debt stability, we now 
investigate if fiscal policy can reduce the power of animal spirits and remove such a 
source of instability from the economy.  
In order to shed light on this, we look at the frequency distribution of animal spirits for 
different values of the output parameter, f2, in the government’s fiscal policy rule.   As 
shown in figure 6, even very high values of f2 do not substantially change the frequency 
distribution of animal spirits. 
 
Figure 6: Animal Spirits under Different Output Coefficients in Fiscal Rule [With 
Debt Stabilization] 
            f2=0.4  f3=0.03            f2=0.7 f3=0.03 
  




One possible explanation is the fact that the debt constraint reduces the capability of the 
government to stabilize animal spirits. In order to verify this intuition, we set f3=0 (which 
means excluding the debt constraint from the fiscal policy rule) and re-simulate the 
model for the different values of f2. The results are reported in figure 7 and are quite 
striking. 
Progressively increasing f2 now allows the government to reduce the intensity of animal 
spirits and for sufficiently high values of f2 (very strong emphasis on output stabilization) 
the extreme values in the animal spirits are basically eliminated.  
 
Figure 7: Animal Spirits under Different Output Coefficients in Fiscal Rule [No 
Debt Stabilization] 
            f2=0.4  f3=0            f2=0.7 f3=0 
  





Thus, by combining the evidence from figures 6 and 7, we can conclude that governments 
face a trade-off between the stabilization of animal spirits and the stabilization of public 
debt. This is telling us that governments may not be able to stabilize booms and busts due 
to the debt constraint they face.  
To see this more clearly, suppose that an economy experiences a recession produced by 
a strong wave of pessimism. The recession will lead to an automatic increase in the 
budget deficit and to an increasing public debt.  This leads to a trade-off for the fiscal 
authorities: attempts at stabilizing output by fiscal stimulus will increase the budget 
deficit and raise public debt. The same holds when the economy experiences a boom 
produced by strong optimism. This also implies that there is an opposite movement 
between animal spirits and public debt.  If the government follows a fiscal rule like in 
equation (4), it will have to choose between the stabilization of the animal spirits and the 
stabilization of public debt. 
To support this point, in figure 8 we compare the pattern of animal spirits with the 
movements of public debt around its steady state as simulated in our model.  
 
Figure 8: Animal Spirits and Debt 
 
It can easily be seen that the two series move in opposite directions. This implies that 
periods characterized by high levels of public debt are associated with strong pessimism. 
Conversely, periods characterized by economic agents’ optimism are associated with 
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contractions in public debt. We find that the correlation coefficient between animal 
spirits and public debt in our simulation is equal to -0.75. 
Given the strong co-movements between animal spirits and the output gap, figure 8 
suggests that there may also be a trade-off between the stability of output gap and of 
public debt.  We investigate the existence of such a trade-off in the following way. First, 
the model is simulated 1000 times. Then, we use the average standard deviations of 
output gap and public debt for different values of the output parameter in the fiscal rule 
(f2). The results are represented in figure 9 and 10.  Figure 9 shows how output variability 
changes as f2 increases from 0.1 to 2.  Each line represents the outcome for different 
values of the debt coefficient in the fiscal rule (f3). Figure 10 follows the same logic but 
looks at the variability of public debt. Both figures exhibit the expected results.  
 
Figure 9: Output Variability and Output Parameter in Fiscal Rule  
 
Figure 9 shows that by increasing output stabilization the government reduces output 
volatility. However, an increasing focus by the fiscal authority on debt stabilization 
(increasing f3) implies higher output volatility for any given level of f2. 
Figure 10 shows that higher values of the output stabilization parameter in the fiscal rule 
result in higher public debt volatility. We also observe that an increase in f3 lowers the 
debt volatility for any given level of f2.  
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Figure 10: Debt Variability and Output Parameter in Fiscal Rule 
 
Combining figures 9 and 10, we show the existence of the trade-off between the volatility 
of the output gap and of public debt in figure 11. The horizontal axis shows the standard 
deviation of public debt and the vertical axis the standard deviation of the output gap. 
The downward sloping lines represent the trade-off for different values of f3.  
 




Figure 11 shows how an increase in the stabilization of output comes at a price, i.e. it leads 
to an increase in the volatility of public debt, and vice versa. This can be seen as follows. 
Starting from the upper left point on a trade-off line, as f2 (the output stabilization 
parameter) increases, we move downwards along the line, implying that more output 
stabilization by the government leads to a decline in output volatility at the expense of 
the stability in public debt. 
This result comes from the interaction between animal spirits, the output gap and public 
debt. Assume, for instance, that the economy experiences a phase of strong pessimism. 
This will be associated with decreasing output gap and growing public debt. The 
government is now facing a dilemma: the increasing debt requires a restrictive fiscal 
policy, while the decline in the output gap should be accompanied by an expansionary 
fiscal policy. The reaction of the government to such a trade-off will be determined by the 
parameters in the fiscal rule.  Lower values of f2 (and higher ones of f3) imply little effort 
by the government to stabilize output and allow the fiscal authority to focus on debt 
stabilization instead. The opposite occurs for higher values of f2 and lower values of f3. 
 
6 The Model at the Zero Lower Bound 
Since the financial crisis, the nominal interest rate in many advanced economies has 
dropped and reached the ZLB. Recent studies have shown that the functioning of a system 
can be substantially different under this circumstance (see Fernández-Villaverde et al., 
2015, Aruoba et al., 2018; Christiano et al., 2011; Woodford, 2011). Thus, as a last step in 
our analysis, we impose the condition that rt > 0 and study the functioning of our model 
when the ZLB binds.  
In figure 12, we show the simulated series of output gap, inflation and public debt in the 
time domain. We plot these series together with the ones representing the time path of 
animal spirits and of the fraction of inflation extrapolators when the model is calibrated 
by imposing the ZLB.  We keep the assumption that the central bank sets the inflation 
target at 0.  
The results of the simulation imply that when the ZLB prevails, the economy can be 
trapped into a deflationary spiral that is dynamically unstable.  
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This is confirmed by the simulated series of the output gap (panel A) and inflation (panel 
B). At the same time, the public debt level explodes (see panel C). 
The contrast with the results obtained in the previous sections is strengthened by the 
series representing the animal spirits and the fraction of inflation extrapolators reported 
in figure 12. Panel A shows that animal spirits are characterized by extreme pessimism 
when the ZLB binds and the economy is gripped the deflationary spiral. Furthermore, 
panel B shows that, once the economy enters the deflationary spiral, extrapolative 
expectations on inflation prevail as a result of the declining paths in the inflation rate. 
Thus, agents stop using the central banks’ target as a credible reference point. 
Furthermore, the model shows how the chronic pessimism is also associated with an 
explosive dynamics of public debt.  
According to our model, the inflation target of the central bank plays a crucial role in 
relation to the ZLB. It can be shown that when the central bank targets a low level of 
inflation, the chances that the system can hit the ZLB, and enters a deflationary spiral, are 
substantially higher (see Summers, 1991). We show this in figure 13. The system has been 
simulated for different values of the inflation target (from 0 to 5%). For each target, we 
have run 50 simulations of the model for 130 periods.  In panel A, the number of times 
that the system has hit the ZLB are reported. Clearly, progressively increasing the 
inflation target allows the system to avoid the ZLB. In panel B, we also present the number 
of times that the system, after hitting the ZLB, has been trapped in the deflationary spiral. 
Again, we can conclude that higher values of the inflation target imply lower risk of 
entering a deflationary spiral. From the results in figure 13, we can conclude that an 
inflation target between 4% and 5% should be able to avoid the system entering the 
unstable deflationary spiral. The interpretation suggested by our model is the following. 
The lower the inflation target, the more cyclical movements in output gap and animal 
spirits can lead to recessions that also drive inflation into negative territories. When this 
happens, the zero bound constraint that applies to the nominal interest rates makes it 
impossible for the central bank to lower the real interest rate to stimulate the economy. 
If the recession is deep, and deflation intense, the real interest rate is likely to increase 
significantly. Thus, the recession becomes protracted and the deflationary spiral is 
amplified by the growing pessimism. This will then imply the dynamic unsustainability 
of public debt.  
31 
 
Based on our results, we can conclude that low levels of inflation target constitute a 
breeding ground for deflationary spirals11.  
 





                                                          
11 The dynamics of a similar model under different inflation targets when the ZLB prevails is analyzed further in 




In this paper, we have analyzed fiscal policy in the framework of a behavioral 
macroeconomic model.  In order to do so, we have extended the behavioral New 
Keynesian model of De Grauwe (2011) by adding a fiscal policy block. The model has non-
linear features and due to the agents’ cognitive limitations, generates waves of optimism 
and pessimism (animal spirits).  This framework has allowed us to study the effects of 
government spending by taking into account its interactions with animal spirits, 
monetary policy and public debt.  Our main results can be summarized as follows.  
First, our behavioral model shows that the short-run spending multiplier is characterized 
by substantial volatility and state-dependency. The short-run multiplier depends on the 
animal spirits and on the state of the business cycle. It is stronger under both extreme 
optimism and pessimism and reduces in periods of tranquility. One policy implication is 
that austerity measures in periods of strong economic contraction have a relatively 
strong negative impact on output.  
We have also shown that another source of state-dependency of the multiplier is 
monetary policy. An active role of the central bank in the stabilization of output reduces 
the real effects of fiscal policy. The more the monetary authority focuses on output 
stabilization, the lower the short-run impact of public expenditure on output.  
Second, we have found that, under common and reasonable calibrations of the fiscal rule, 
fiscal policy is not able to reduce the presence of animal spirits even assuming strong 
focus on output stabilization. To be able to reduce the presence of animal spirits, 
governments should give up public debt stabilization. This result depends on the fact that 
periods of increasing public debt are characterized by intense pessimism, while periods 
of decreasing public debt are characterized by intense optimism. This finding has then 
led us to show how governments face a trade-off between the stabilization of the output 
gap and the stabilization of public debt.  
Finally, we have analyzed our model when the ZLB on the interest rate prevails. We have 
shown that, depending on the level of the central bank’s inflation target, the economy can 
be trapped into a deflationary spiral in which the system also experiences chronic 
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